Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Use memset_io() to clear QLAFX00 request ring slot For QLAFX00 the request ring is ioremapped device I/O memory (ha->iobase + req_que_off), not DMA-coherent RAM, which is why the rest of the FX00 path accesses it through memcpy_toio() and the wrt_reg_* helpers. __qla2x00_alloc_iocbs() however zeroed the producer slot with a plain memset(). On architectures such as ARM64 a regular memset() may emit unaligned or block-zeroing instructions (e.g. DC ZVA) that are invalid on Device memory, leading to a synchronous external abort. Use memset_io() to clear the slot for QLAFX00, matching the I/O accessors used elsewhere on this ring. Other adapters keep the plain memset() on their DMA-coherent rings. The zero-fill is retained for FX00 because its IOCB builders (e.g. qlafx00_fxdisc_iocb()) copy only part of the entry and rely on the unused tail being pre-zeroed.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/crypto: Fix skcipher_walk return code handling in aes_s390 The return codes from skcipher_walk_virt() were not properly checked before entering the processing loops in ecb_aes_crypt() and ctr_aes_crypt(). If skcipher_walk_virt() fails, the walk structure may be in an undefined state, and attempting to process data could lead to incorrect behavior or accessing uninitialized memory. Add proper return code checking to ensure correct handling of the walk initialization and walk advance and eventually return to the caller with that return code.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: do_close_on_exec() before taking exec_update_lock do_close_on_exec() currently happens while holding the exec_update_lock, which is used in a lot of places that access process state to synchronize access checks. I recently added another such use of exec_update_lock, causing a regression. do_close_on_exec() can block waiting for a reply from a filesystem. That means a hung filesystem can block codepaths that use exec_update_lock; and it also means that a FUSE filesystem which attempts to inspect the calling process can deadlock. To avoid such problems, move do_close_on_exec() before the exec_update_lock is taken, but after the FD table has been copied if necessary. I have looked through all the calls between the old and new position of the do_close_on_exec() call; there seems to be no file descriptor table access in between.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: skip gfx switch_power_profile during GPU reset During resume from GPU reset, the gfx idle work may invoke switch_power_profile before the reset completes. This causes the following assert error because the register access occurs without first releasing the GPU reset semaphore: [ 1576.768935] CR2: 0000559ea133ead0 CR3: 00000002e6c42000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 1576.768940] Call Trace: [ 1576.768944] <TASK> [ 1576.768953] amdgpu_device_rreg+0x21/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 1576.769158] smu_msg_v1_send_msg+0x1a4/0x6e0 [amdgpu] [ 1576.769437] smu_cmn_send_smc_msg_with_params_ext+0xba/0x120 [amdgpu] [ 1576.769721] smu_cmn_send_smc_msg_with_param+0x33/0x40 [amdgpu] [ 1576.769993] smu_v13_0_0_set_power_profile_mode+0x192/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ 1576.770267] smu_bump_power_profile_mode+0x5d/0x80 [amdgpu] [ 1576.770538] smu_switch_power_profile+0xa4/0xf0 [amdgpu] [ 1576.770839] amdgpu_dpm_switch_power_profile+0x6f/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 1576.771210] amdgpu_gfx_profile_idle_work_handler+0xe9/0x130 [amdgpu] [ 1576.771460] process_one_work+0x23e/0x6f0 [ 1576.771491] worker_thread+0x1c4/0x380 [ 1576.771506] kthread+0x10c/0x150 [ 1576.771512] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1576.771518] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1576.771530] ret_from_fork+0x314/0x390 [ 1576.771537] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1576.771546] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 (cherry picked from commit d93b1ff538ce9750c01e0dd0aa62575579c0fc08)

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/amd_node: Avoid divide by zero on virtualized systems On a virtualized system, the number of nodes does not have a relationship to the number of roots. A Xen PVH dom0 can calculate roots_per_node as 0, which crashes with a divide by zero in: if (count++ % roots_per_node) because the underlying topology code on Xen ends up making num_nodes 2 and num_roots 1 and the integer division result is 0. The issue is seen with Xen, but it could affect other systems. Set roots_per_node to 1 in this case. Print a firmware bug when this is performed for non-virtualized systems. [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Guard page-fault worker with runtime PM check During VM teardown, the VM's runtime PM reference is dropped asynchronously, allowing the device to autosuspend while stale page faults belonging to the now-dead VM are still queued. When the page-fault worker later tries to ack one of these, it calls into guc_ct_send_locked() on an already-suspended device, tripping: Assertion `!xe_pm_runtime_suspended(xe)` failed! WARNING at xe_device.c:1267 xe_device_assert_mem_access+0x11c/0x140 [xe] A live VM/exec queue always holds a PM reference while it has outstanding work, so if the device is suspended at ack time, the owning context is already gone and the fault is stale. Take a runtime PM reference across the entire pagefault queue worker to safely deliver acks for torn-down VMs. v3: - Move PM ref to the generic xe_pagefault_queue_work using guard(xe_pm_runtime)(xe) instead of tracking it in the GuC backend(Matt Brost). v2: - Hold PM ref across the entire batch (begin/end) instead of per-ack. This prevents the device from autosuspending mid-batch, which would leave write_only acks written but the end flush skipped, and skip counter++, desyncing the cadence check.(Himal) - Add a comment explaining stale faults.(Himal) (cherry picked from commit fcc2431d2213dc4d04250c4f1ae87d9c3ae0d455) [Rodrigo: Added xe_device struct for compatibility while cherry-picking]

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: fix tx_handle bounds off-by-one Valid indices into txq->urbd0s/tfds/bufs are 0..txq->count-1, so tfd_index == txq->count is already out of range. Change the guard in btintel_pcie_msix_tx_handle() from '> txq->count' to '>= txq->count'. This issue was reported by Claude Mythos.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv4: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP_MAX_MTU to avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IP_MTU_DISCOVER is set to IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over a netdev with an unusually large MTU. Steps to reproduce: 1. Set device MTU bigger than IP_MAX_MTU + 20. cork->base.fragsize will be set to that MTU in ip_setup_cork. 2. Set IP_MTU_DISCOVER to IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE. It lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in __ip_append_data, rather than to IP_MAX_MTU. 3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +20 bytes of IPv4 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than IP_MAX_MTU + IPv4 header, and the device MTU is bigger than that). 4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the 16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short. Note: IP_PMTUDISC_DO with IPv4 is safe, because ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward always clamps at IP_MAX_MTU, unlike ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward. The Fixes tag points at the first commit where I could reproduce the overflow with IPv4 and IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Return immediately when manage_oob() returns NULL for 0-length buffer. Fahad Alharbi reported that recv(0, MSG_PEEK) triggers busy-wait in unix_stream_read_generic() if recv() is blocking and the last skb in the queue is MSG_OOB skb. In such a situation, TCP returns 0 immediately regardless of blocking or non-blocking. Let's follow the behaviour.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/entry: Fix irq_soft_mask corruption on replayed interrupt exit When __replay_soft_interrupts() replays a pending interrupt (e.g. PACA_IRQ_DEC -> timer_interrupt), it calls the handler directly with a synthetic pt_regs. The DEFINE_INTERRUPT_HANDLER_ASYNC wrapper around each handler calls arch_interrupt_async_exit_prepare() on the way out, which calls arch_interrupt_exit_prepare() -> local_irq_disable() -> arch_local_irq_disable(), which does: irq_soft_mask_set(IRQS_DISABLED) /* 0x1 */ This unconditionally overwrites irq_soft_mask with IRQS_DISABLED (0x1), stripping the IRQS_PMI_DISABLED (0x2) bit. The result is that irq_soft_mask is 0x1 instead of IRQS_ALL_DISABLED (0x3) when the handler returns to __replay_soft_interrupts(). For a normally-taken interrupt this is harmless: the next interrupt always enters through arch_interrupt_enter_prepare() which unconditionally sets irq_soft_mask to IRQS_ALL_DISABLED. But during replay, next_interrupt() is called directly between replayed handlers without going back through arch_interrupt_enter_prepare(), so the stripped bit is never restored. next_interrupt() then fires a WARNING: WARNING: arch/powerpc/kernel/irq_64.c:75 WARN_ON(irq_soft_mask_return() != IRQS_ALL_DISABLED) The warning was observed early in boot on a POWER10 pseries guest during kmem_cache_init_late(), where a spinlock release triggers interrupt replay that processes a pending timer interrupt. Debugger state confirming the bug: Before timer_interrupt(&regs): irq_soft_mask = 0x3 (IRQS_ALL_DISABLED) correct irq_happened = 0x41 (HARD_DIS|REPLAYING) correct After timer_interrupt(&regs) returns: irq_soft_mask = 0x1 (IRQS_DISABLED) WRONG - PMI bit stripped irq_happened = 0x41 unchanged The fix is to replace local_irq_disable() with hard_irq_disable(). hard_irq_disable() is the right primitive here for two reasons: 1. On PPC64 (hw_irq.h:301) it calls irq_soft_mask_set_return(IRQS_ALL_DISABLED), setting the soft mask to 0x3 (both IRQS_DISABLED and IRQS_PMI_DISABLED), which preserves the PMI bit and fixes the WARNING. The additional work it does (__hard_irq_disable(), PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS |=) is redundant but safe since both are already set at this point in the exit path; the trace_hardirqs_off() inside is guarded by if (!arch_irqs_disabled_flags(flags)) so it will not double-fire. 2. On PPC32 (hw_irq.h:467) hard_irq_disable() maps to arch_local_irq_disable() -> __hard_irq_disable(), which clears MSR[EE] in hardware. This is exactly correct: PPC32 has no soft-mask PACA mechanism, so the hardware disable is the right way to satisfy irqentry_exit()'s requirement. This also fixes a build error on PPC32 where irq_soft_mask_set() is only defined under CONFIG_PPC64: arch/powerpc/include/asm/entry-common.h:273: error: implicit declaration of function 'irq_soft_mask_set' Using hard_irq_disable() requires no #ifdef and is consistent with how the rest of the entry code (e.g. entry-common.h:463) handles the same PPC32/PPC64 split.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc: Do not restore KUAP in arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() KUAP means kernel cannot touch user memory unless it explicitly is enabled. In the kernel it should stay AMR_KUAP_BLOCKED. While returning to userspace just before RFI, kernel should restore the user AMR value back. Looks like GENERIC_ENTRY might be treating arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() as the last architecture step before returning to userspace. commit bee25f97ad24 ("powerpc: Enable GENERIC_ENTRY feature") therefore called kuap_user_restore() from that hook. But on PowerPC that is too early. After irqentry_exit() / syscall_exit_to_user_mode() we still run platform specific exit routines. e.g. code snippets showing both exception handling and system call handling as the callers of function arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() which does kuap_user_restore(). The below path shows that calling kuap_user_restore() is too early when called from arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(). Exception handling in exceptions-64s.S ======================================= bl CFUNC(do_page_fault) ..DEFINE_INTERRUPT_HANDLER_ASYNC(do_page_fault) arch_interrupt_async_enter_prepare(regs); state = irqentry_enter(regs); instrumentation_begin(); irq_enter_rcu(); handler(regs); nap_adjust_return(regs); irq_exit_rcu(); instrumentation_end(); arch_interrupt_async_exit_prepare(regs); irqentry_exit(regs, state); <<< too early irqentry_exit_to_user_mode() __exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs, EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK_IRQ); arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs, ti_work); <<< too early b interrupt_return_srr .. bl CFUNC(interrupt_exit_user_prepare) <<< already calls kuap_user_restore prep_irq_for_enabled_exit() retry can run kernel code with IRQs on. So only when that routine is fully finished is when the user KUAP should be fully restored which interrupt_exit_user_prepare() already takes care of before returning. Similarly for system call handling in interrupt_64.S ====================================================== bl CFUNC(system_call_exception) .Lsyscall_exit: addi r4,r1,STACK_INT_FRAME_REGS li r5,0 /* !scv */ bl CFUNC(syscall_exit_prepare) .. kuap_assert_locked(); syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs); <<< too early syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs); <<< too early kuap_user_restore(regs); <<< already calls syscall_exit_prepare(), which can enable IRQs, replay a pending interrupt, and only then rfi. Those functions already restore KUAP immediately before rfi. Note that if we restore the user AMR too early like in the current code as shown from the code snippets above, then we get the following warning when CONFIG_PPC_KUAP_DEBUG is enabled: WARNING: arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup.h:293 at interrupt_exit_user_prepare+0x1a0/0x1c0 Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER10 (architected) TRAP: 0700 LR: c00000000000d8d4 CTR: c0000000021fe500 MSR: <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44000804 XER: 20040000 interrupt_exit_user_prepare+0x1a0/0x1c0 interrupt_return_srr_user+0x8/0x12c

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: x86-android-tablets: hold device reference for secondary fwnode teardown In gpio_secondary_fwnode_init(), acpi_bus_find_device_by_name() returns a device reference, but the local dev variable is declared with __free(put_device), dropping the reference at the end of each iteration. Meanwhile, devm_add_action_or_reset() saves the dev pointer for gpio_secondary_unset() without incrementing its reference count, which could lead to a use-after-free during driver teardown if the device is released in the interim. Acquire an explicit device reference with get_device() when registering the devres action, and drop it with put_device() inside gpio_secondary_unset().

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: locking/lockdep: Invalidate stale class_cache entries for zapped classes syzbot reported a lockdep splat hitting DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1) in hlock_class() due to an invalid class_idx: WARNING: kernel/locking/lockdep.c:238 at __lock_acquire+0x382/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5203 Workqueue: wg-crypt-wg0 wg_packet_tx_worker RIP: 0010:hlock_class kernel/locking/lockdep.c:238 [inline] RIP: 0010:check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4870 [inline] RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x389/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5203 Call Trace: <IRQ> lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5886 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:173 tcp_tsq_handler+0x29/0x200 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1291 tcp_tsq_workfn+0x384/0x410 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1325 ... When a lock class is zapped (e.g. during module unload or key unregistration), zap_class() clears the class's bit in lock_classes_in_use and removes it from the class hash table. However, existing lockdep_map instances embedded in data structures may still retain a pointer to the zapped class in their class_cache[] array. When __lock_acquire() subsequently runs on such a lock, it finds lock->class_cache[subclass] != NULL, skipping register_lock_class() and assigning hlock->class_idx to the index of the zapped class. When check_wait_context() or hlock_class() inspects the held_lock, it finds !test_bit(class_idx, lock_classes_in_use) and warns. Furthermore, if the zapped slot is subsequently re-allocated to an unrelated lock key, the stale class_cache entry would erroneously match the unrelated class (ABA issue). Add lock_class_cache_is_valid() to validate that the cached class is within lock_classes bounds, still allocated in lock_classes_in_use (using uninstrumented arch_test_bit() in __always_inline context so it is safe in noinstr contexts like match_held_lock()), and that class->key matches the expected subkey (taking lockdep_set_subclass() overrides into account). Also use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() when accessing class_cache[]. If the entry is invalid or stale, fall back to register_lock_class() / look_up_lock_class().

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/ipl: Fix NULL deref in dump_reipl without re-IPL parm block Unlike kdump, which passes the re-IPL parameter block through os_info, the stand-alone dump passes it through the IPL parm block address and checksum in lowcore. Some IPL types, like HMC FTP boot or QEMU direct kernel boot, might not provide an IPL parameter block. In this case reipl_type_init() selects IPL_TYPE_UNKNOWN and reipl_block_actual remains NULL. Nevertheless, dump_reipl_run() unconditionally dereferences it when preparing the lowcore fields. This may happen to work by chance when address zero contains readable lowcore data. A zero IPL parameter block address is then stored in lowcore, causing the stand-alone dumper to enter disabled wait after completing the dump. Explicitly store a zero IPL parameter block address and checksum when no re-IPL parameter block is available. This does not change the behavior: the stand-alone dumper completes the dump and halts, while valid re-IPL parameter blocks continue to be handled as before.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/ipl: Fix NULL deref in kdump without re-IPL parm block Some IPL types, like HMC FTP boot or QEMU direct kernel boot, might not provide an IPL parameter block. In this case, reipl_type_init() selects IPL_TYPE_UNKNOWN, and reipl_block_actual remains NULL. kdump passes the re-IPL parameter block to the dump kernel through os_info. Before commit 3b9678472bab ("s390/ipl: correct kdump reipl block checksum calculation"), the os_info entry was added only for IPL types which initialized reipl_block_actual. That commit moved the os_info update to machine_crash_shutdown(), making it unconditional. As a result, set_os_info_reipl_block() dereferences reipl_block_actual for IPL_TYPE_UNKNOWN. This may happen to work by chance when address zero contains readable lowcore data and the resulting empty os_info entry is ignored by the dump kernel. Skip the os_info update when no re-IPL parameter block is available. Kdump then collect the dump and reboot without setting re-IPL parameter block.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: icmp: avoid invalid transport header access in icmp_send tracepoint syzbot reported a WARNING triggered by DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(): WARNING: at skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3087 [inline] WARNING: at udp_hdr include/linux/udp.h:23 [inline] WARNING: at do_trace_event_raw_event_icmp_send include/trace/events/icmp.h:30 [inline] WARNING: at trace_event_raw_event_icmp_send+0x48c/0x6ec include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 Call trace: skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3087 [inline] udp_hdr include/linux/udp.h:23 [inline] do_trace_event_raw_event_icmp_send include/trace/events/icmp.h:30 [inline] trace_event_raw_event_icmp_send+0x48c/0x6ec include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 __traceiter_icmp_send include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 [inline] __do_trace_icmp_send include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 [inline] trace_icmp_send+0x320/0x49c include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 __icmp_send+0xcfc/0x11d8 net/ipv4/icmp.c:1013 ipv4_send_dest_unreach net/ipv4/route.c:1280 [inline] ipv4_link_failure+0x57c/0x8dc net/ipv4/route.c:1287 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:438 [inline] vti_tunnel_xmit+0xe40/0x17a4 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:307 TP_fast_assign() unconditionally calls udp_hdr(skb) before checking whether the packet is UDP. Furthermore, __icmp_send() can be invoked from paths (e.g., link failures, ARP errors, forwarding, AF_PACKET) where skb->transport_header was never initialized (~0U). Under CONFIG_DEBUG_NET=y, calling skb_transport_header(skb) triggers DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)). Fix this by: 1. Only parsing transport info when iph->protocol == IPPROTO_UDP. 2. Using skb_header_pointer() at skb_network_offset(skb) + (iph->ihl << 2) to safely fetch the UDP header without assuming transport_header is set.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/boot: Avoid IPL parameter append past command line A command line may occupy all but the terminating byte of COMMAND_LINE_SIZE. In that case append_ipl_block_parm() passes a zero size to the IPL parameter conversion helpers and points the destination one byte past early_command_line. The helpers subtract one from the unsigned size and write the converted parameter outside the command line buffer. Convert the IPL parameter in the command line parsing buffer first. A parameter beginning with '=' can then replace the existing command line regardless of its length, while other parameters are appended only when space remains.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: Fix a NULL vs ERR_PTR() bug in virtio_gpu_user_framebuffer_create() Smatch complains that returning a NULL here will lead to a NULL pointer dereference in drm_mode_addfb2(). Return an error pointer instead.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is still present in the driver. When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate() in wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls rdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in cfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but flags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails. When the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued during interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the running check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear. Check IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before calling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in driver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not in driver. This change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in cfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared under RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and drv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free against driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other not-running paths use and does not introduce new locking. [also add second syzbot report]

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rsi: fix heap OOB write on key removal When a key is removed (data == NULL), rsi_hal_load_key() runs: memset(&set_key[FRAME_DESC_SZ], 0, frame_len - FRAME_DESC_SZ); set_key is a struct rsi_set_key *, so the subscript is scaled by sizeof(struct rsi_set_key) (160 bytes): &set_key[FRAME_DESC_SZ] is skb->data + 2560, and the memset writes 144 zero bytes starting 2.4KB past the end of the 160-byte skb data buffer, corrupting unrelated heap objects. The intended byte offset would have been (u8 *)set_key + FRAME_DESC_SZ. The write fires on every DISABLE_KEY callback, so plain disconnects, roams and interface teardowns trigger it on real networks. The memset is redundant: the whole buffer is zeroed right after allocation, so the frame sent to the device is byte-identical without it. Drop the else branch; normal operation is unaffected. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watchdog: rzv2h: Avoid division by zero clk_get_rate() could return 0. Avoid a division by zero panic.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watchdog: rtd119x: Avoid division by zero clk_get_rate() could return 0. Avoid a division by zero panic.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watchdog: da9063: fix suspend/resume handling of HW_RUNNING watchdog da9063_wdt_suspend() and da9063_wdt_resume() only check watchdog_active(), when the watchdog is left running by the driver sets WDOG_HW_RUNNING in da9063_wdt_probe() but userspace never opens the device, so WDOG_ACTIVE remains cleared, the wdt_disable() will not be executed in da9063_wdt_suspend. In this case, the suspend callback is a no-op and the watchdog keeps counting during system suspend, leading to an unexpected system reset. Check WDOG_HW_RUNNING and wdd，can fix this issue.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: sequencing: fix NULL-pointer dereference in pwrseq_device_register() If dev_set_name() fails in pwrseq_device_register(), we jump to the err_put_pwrseq label before initializing pwrseq->targets. pwrseq_release() will try to iterate over targets unconditionally and subsequently dereference an invalid pointer. Move the call to dev_set_name() after the list head is initialized.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: sequencing: fix NULL-pointer dereference in pwrseq_unit_new() If memory allocation fails in pwrseq_unit_setup_deps(), pwrseq_unit_put() is called to release the partially initialized unit. However, we've never initialized unit->list and pwrseq_unit_release() will unconditionally call list_del() on it. Initialize unit->list right after allocating the unit struct.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit() avc_has_perm_noaudit() is documented to return a copy of the access decision in @avd, but its early return for an empty requested permission set leaves the buffer untouched. All callers pass an uninitialized stack variable and afterwards feed it to avc_audit(), and the inode hook even stores it in the per-task decision cache. Fill in a deny-all, audit-all decision, similar to avd_init(), so every caller receives a defined value at no cost on the hot path.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcg: avoid charging the root memcg from obj_cgroup_charge_pages() obj_cgroup_charge_pages() resolves the objcg to its memcg and calls try_charge_memcg(), which does not short circuit the root memcg. That memcg can be the root memcg: obj_cgroup_is_root() reflects the memcg the objcg was created for and is never updated, while memcg_reparent_objcgs() does redirect objcg->memcg to the parent on rmdir. An objcg of a dying child of root therefore passes every obj_cgroup_is_root() filter but resolves to the root memcg. Folios keep the objcg they were charged with, so this is easy to reach through zswap: allocate anon memory in a cgroup, move the task out, remove the cgroup, then write to the root cgroup's memory.reclaim. The reclaimed folios are charged through the reparented objcg and end up in refill_stock() with the root memcg: WARNING: mm/memcontrol.c:2198 at refill_stock+0x644/0x940 refill_stock+0x644/0x940 try_charge_memcg+0x12d6/0x1570 __obj_cgroup_charge+0x35/0xf0 obj_cgroup_charge+0x1de/0x210 obj_cgroup_charge_zswap+0x83/0x270 zswap_store+0x1620/0x2000 swap_writeout+0x94c/0x14c0 shrink_folio_list+0x3388/0x52b0 [...] try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages+0x30d/0x830 user_proactive_reclaim+0x504/0x840 memory_reclaim+0x1f/0x30 Beyond the warning, the charge is asymmetric: obj_cgroup_uncharge_pages() skips refill_stock() for the root memcg, so the root's page counter grows and is never uncharged. It is not user visible, since memory.current is not exposed on the root, but it is a leak. Use try_charge(), which returns early for the root memcg, restoring the symmetry with obj_cgroup_uncharge_pages(). The above sequence was scripted into a standalone reproducer (zswap on, swap on a virtio disk, 512MB of anon memory faulted in inside a child of the root cgroup, the task then migrated to the root cgroup, the child removed, followed by "echo 600M swappiness=max > memory.reclaim" on the root) and run in a CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y VM. It reproduces the splat on the first zswap store of a reparented folio, with the same call chain as the report. With this patch applied the splat is gone while the zswap store count over the run is unchanged, so the same path is still exercised. cgroup selftests test_zswap, test_kmem and test_memcontrol show no new failures.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: soc: samsung: exynos-pmu: fix use-after-free of interrupt generator node The setup_cpuhp_and_cpuidle() parses the device tree node for the interrupt generation block via of_parse_phandle() and decrements its reference count using of_node_put() immediately after fetching the resource address. However, later the intr_gen_node pointer is passed into of_syscon_register_regmap(). Fix this by declaring intr_gen_node with __free() and removing of_node_put().

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: ti: k3-udma-glue: fix NULL dereference in k3_udma_glue_release_rx_chn() If devm_kcalloc() for rx_chn->flows fails in a channel request function, the error path calls k3_udma_glue_release_rx_chn(), which dereferences the NULL rx_chn->flows pointer in k3_udma_glue_release_rx_flow(). Skip the flow release loop in k3_udma_glue_release_rx_chn() when rx_chn->flows is not allocated. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: xfrm: reject unrepresentable espintcp transport headers ESP-in-TCP can hand xfrm packets whose transport header offset no longer fits after the stream parser trims the TCP envelope. The plain transport header reset truncates that offset and triggers the skb warning path. Use the careful transport-header helper and drop the skb through the existing XFRM error path when the offset cannot be represented.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Avoid false migration warning for proxy donors Proxy execution can move a blocked donor's scheduling context to the lock owner's CPU even when the donor is migration-disabled. The donor does not execute there, and its original execution CPU remains recorded in wake_cpu. set_task_cpu() warns unconditionally for migration-disabled tasks, so a subsequent proxy migration or the wakeup path returning the donor home triggers a false positive: moving a blocked scheduling context does not violate the migration-disabled execution context. For example, creating a mutex owner on CPU1 and a migration-disabled waiter on CPU0 can trigger the following warning: proxy_migrate_repro: donor blocking on CPU0 with migration disabled proxy_migrate_repro: donor moved from CPU0 to CPU1 WARNING: kernel/sched/core.c:3389 at set_task_cpu+0x1d3/0x280 ... Call Trace: try_to_wake_up+0x43f/0x780 __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x330/0x540 owner_fn+0x9f/0xc0 [proxy_migrate_repro] ... proxy_migrate_repro: donor woke on CPU0, task_cpu=0 proxy_migrate_repro: completed Exclude blocked proxy donors from the warning. The proxy wakeup path restores an executable placement before clearing the blocked state.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: follow SMB2 session expiration semantics ksmbd_session_register() destroys valid sessions after ten seconds of inactivity whenever a client starts another SessionSetup exchange. This confuses Session.IdleTime with Session.ExpirationTime. Windows can create additional authenticated sessions on an existing connection, so deleting the older session invalidates its tree connects and makes mapped drives fail with STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED. The session expiration rules require the server to change a valid session to expired only after its credential expiration time passes. A valid or expired session otherwise keeps its connection from being scavenged. Connections that have not negotiated a dialect, have no sessions, or have only InProgress sessions are disconnected after an implementation-specific timeout. Use the Windows-compatible 45 second value and run the expiration check periodically for both TCP and SMB Direct. Keep zero as an infinite credential expiration time, and count each Valid-to-Expired transition. Set expired sessions to InProgress when they reauthenticate. If authentication fails, remove the session from the global and per-connection tables immediately, including SMB3 multichannel connections. Retain protection against abandoned SessionId-zero exchanges by allowing only one InProgress authentication per connection. Additional exchanges fail with STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES, and stale InProgress sessions are reaped after the same 45 second setup timeout. This bounds the original unauthenticated memory-exhaustion path without evicting established sessions.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: require a peer station for TDLS setup confirm It's nonsense for the setup confirm to go to station that doesn't even exist, and it hits a warning when building the frame: WARN_ON_ONCE(!sta || !ap_sta) Only accept WLAN_TDLS_SETUP_CONFIRM when the station is already there as a TDLS station. Need to copy the call to ieee80211_tdls_prep_mgmt_packet() since the existing WLAN_TDLS_DISCOVERY_REQUEST already falls through to it.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: reset the AP_VLAN tailroom counter on ifdown On ifup, AP_VLAN interfaces get crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt from the AP interface, but it's never decremented again unless the AP is also brought down. Thus, bringing the same AP_VLAN up again will increment the counter again and eventually hit the sanity check: WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt != master->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt); Reset it on ifdown to avoid that.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211_hwsim: don't hand frames to mac80211 while stopping The code checks ->started for frames coming from wmediumd, but the radio can be stopped after the check and before frame delivery, causing mac80211 to hit the WARN_ON(!local->started). Expand the mutex for this case and synchronise against it when the radio is stopped to avoid being able to hit the warning with hwsim. Drop the error print that would've complicated the error path, it only triggers for allocation failures (already noisy) and malformed frames anyway.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: undo netns switch if renaming the wiphy fails Once all the interfaces have been moved, cfg80211_switch_netns() moves the wiphy itself by setting its network namespace and then renaming it, which makes sysfs move it. The rename can fail (but only on allocation failures), leaving things mixed up and hitting the warning there. Ignoring it isn't great, undo the move and let the change fail in this case. If undo fails then WARN, then things would again be stuck in two different network namespaces.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: don't warn when an IBSS has no channel to scan ieee80211_request_ibss_scan() warns when regulatory leaves no allowed channel, but that can happen as the regdomain can change while IBSS is operating, and it can continue to operate briefly during the 60s grace period until it's shut down. Just remove the warning in this case.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: fix IRQ leak using wrong index in MSI-X error path mwifiex_pcie_request_irq() registers each MSI-X vector with a per-index dev_id (&card->msix_ctx[i]). On a request_irq() failure the cleanup loop "for (j = 0; j < i; j++)" frees msix_entries[j].vector but passes the failed index's &card->msix_ctx[i] as the dev_id. free_irq() matches on (irq, dev_id), so it fails to find the action registered with &card->msix_ctx[j]: the already-requested IRQ j is not freed (leaked) and free_irq() warns about freeing a non-existent IRQ. Use &card->msix_ctx[j].

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: codel: bound the dropping loop per dequeue call The CoDel control law schedules the next drop one interval/sqrt(count) after the previous drop, using the configured interval (codel_params.interval). For very small intervals the scheduled step rounds down to zero, so the dropping loop in codel_dequeue() never advances and drains the entire backlog under the qdisc lock in one call - an unprivileged user can trigger a soft lockup this way. Fix in the shared codel code used by both codel and fq_codel: 1. Make the control-law step at least 1 tick so the dropping loop always moves forward. 2. Cap the dropping loop at CODEL_MAX_DROPS_PER_DEQUEUE (256) drops per codel_dequeue() call, resyncing drop_next to now when the cap is hit: the catch-up owed to the loop grows with the idle gap and the backlog, which no interval threshold can bound. This is a deliberate behaviour change after long idle gaps. The cap applies to fq_codel (4b549a2ef4be) and the mac80211 TXQ path (fixed interval, cap only). The target sojourn delay (codel_params.target) is not validated: it does not feed the control law, so a sub-tick value is aggressive rather than deadlock-prone. Conditions to recreate the bug: - tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: tbf rate 1kbit burst 2kb limit 1000000 - tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 10: codel interval 2us target 1ms noecn limit 1000000 (same for fq_codel) - unpatched kernel: tc accepts it; a UDP flood under the 1kbit tbf soft-lockups (watchdog: BUG: soft lockup) while one codel_dequeue() call drops the backlog under the qdisc lock - patched kernel: same setup, at most 256 drops per dequeue call, no soft lockup Testing: claim reproducer and interval 2us/3us variants run clean; tdc qdisc category passes (see the selftests patch).

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb: 6fire: Avoid embedded URBs The USB 6fire driver uses URBs embedded in different structs for PCM, MIDI and communication, and this is basically a buggy implementation nowadays; since a URB is managed with a refcount, this may lead to a UAF when the URB is released asynchronously. For addressing the problem, this patch converts those embedded URBs to ones that are properly allocated via usb_alloc_urb(). The pcm_urb.packets[] is gone, as it's allocated by usb_alloc_urb(), hence it's found in urb.iso_frame_desc[] instead. The conversions are rather straightforward; each embedded struct urb is changed to a pointer, and its callers are updated accordingly. The resource for those structs are released in the common destructor functions (usb6fire_comm_free(), etc), which are called at both the init error path and the disconnect. No functional changes, only compile-tested.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/efa: Keep EQ resources alive while IRQ is registered The completion IRQ handler accesses the EQ state and DMA buffer. Its IRQ was registered before that state was initialized, while teardown released the buffer before free_irq() synchronized the handler. Initialize the EQ without arming it, register the IRQ, and then arm it. Reverse the resource order during teardown by freeing the IRQ before destroying the EQ.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/efa: Keep admin queues alive while IRQ is registered The management IRQ handler accesses both the admin completion queue and the async event queue. The driver registered the IRQ before constructing these queues and destroyed them before freeing the IRQ, so the handler's lifetime was not contained by the resources it accesses. Initialize the queues with interrupts masked, request the IRQ, and then switch to interrupt mode. On removal, reset the device and free the IRQ before destroying the queues. Also reset the device before destroying the queues if IRQ registration fails, because the device already has their DMA addresses.

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/uverbs: Fix mmap_lock/disassociation_lock circular dependency Commit 51976c6cd786 ("RDMA/core: Provide rdma_user_mmap_disassociate() to disassociate mmap pages") introduced disassociation_lock to protect new mmap registrations against uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate(), but created an ABBA deadlock: Thread A (mmap / fork): mmap_lock -> disassociation_lock Thread B (disassociate): disassociation_lock -> mmap_lock Fix by removing disassociation_lock entirely and using the pre-existing hw_destroy_rwsem instead. hw_destroy_rwsem already provides the same protection: rdma_umap_open() and ib_uverbs_mmap() both use down_read_trylock() before registering a new VMA, so holding hw_destroy_rwsem in uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate() is sufficient to block new registrations. trylock is used in both mmap paths (not blocking down_read) because mmap_lock is already held on entry, and uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate() acquires mmap_lock internally — a blocking read would recreate the same deadlock. The only caller that was not taking hw_destroy_rwsem for write was rdma_user_mmap_disassociate(). Fix it to take the rwsem per-ufile while iterating under lists_mutex. This is safe because ib_uverbs_close() releases hw_destroy_rwsem entirely before acquiring lists_mutex, so the two locks are never held simultaneously. lockdep warning: [ 776.654252] ====================================================== [ 776.655214] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 776.656167] 6.18.0for-upstream_debug_94e244d9ccab #1 Not tainted [ 776.657114] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 776.658087] devlink/14824 is trying to acquire lock: [ 776.658879] ffff88811170c800 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate+0x168/0x780 [ib_uverbs] [ 776.660479] [ 776.660479] but task is already holding lock: [ 776.661460] ffff888142d92b08 (&file->disassociation_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate+0x39/0x780 [ib_uverbs] [ 776.663177] [ 776.663177] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 776.663177] [ 776.664525] [ 776.664525] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 776.665724] [ 776.665724] -> #2 (&file->disassociation_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 776.666887] __mutex_lock+0x16d/0x2330 [ 776.667633] rdma_umap_open+0x129/0x280 [ib_uverbs] [ 776.668489] dup_mmap+0xa40/0x1790 [ 776.669170] copy_process+0x5dd2/0x6170 [ 776.669933] kernel_clone+0xb6/0x610 [ 776.670636] __do_sys_clone+0xb5/0xf0 [ 776.671354] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x12e0 [ 776.672083] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [ 776.672940] [ 776.672940] -> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 776.673985] down_write_nested+0x90/0x1e0 [ 776.674751] dup_mmap+0x201/0x1790 [ 776.675448] copy_process+0x5dd2/0x6170 [ 776.676180] kernel_clone+0xb6/0x610 [ 776.676904] __do_sys_clone+0xb5/0xf0 [ 776.677615] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x12e0 [ 776.678351] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [ 776.679239] [ 776.679239] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 776.680253] __lock_acquire+0x18c6/0x2ec0 [ 776.681018] lock_acquire+0x10e/0x2e0 [ 776.681742] down_read+0x95/0x430 [ 776.682395] uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate+0x168/0x780 [ib_uverbs] [ 776.683436] uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x1ae/0x270 [ib_uverbs] [ 776.684416] ib_uverbs_remove_one+0x22b/0x420 [ib_uverbs] [ 776.685371] remove_client_context+0xa6/0xf0 [ib_core] [ 776.686342] disable_device+0x12b/0x240 [ib_core] [ 776.687249] __ib_unregister_device+0x269/0x460 [ib_core] [ 776.688233] ib_unregister_device+0x21/0x30 [ib_core] [ 776.689140] mlx5r_remove+0xd0/0x170 [mlx5_ib] [ 776.689999] device_release_driver_internal+0x3b2/0x5 ---truncated---

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